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Evidence
by Marc T. Treadwell*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This survey marks the fifteenth year the author has surveyed
Eleventh Circuit evidence decisions. This survey year saw the continuation of what has become a clear trend in Eleventh Circuit evidence
decisions. In stark contrast to the days when the Eleventh Circuit, and
other courts, rigorously examined district court evidentiary decisions and
freely reversed those decisions, the Eleventh Circuit now carefully defers
to district judges. The reason for this trend can be debated. Perhaps,
given that most evidentiary issues addressed by the Eleventh Circuit
arise in the context of criminal cases, Eleventh Circuit judges are today
more conservative and thus less likely to reverse criminal convictions,
particularly on evidentiary grounds. Or, perhaps it is that the abuse of
discretion standard of review, which governs evidentiary issues,
mandates deference to district judges, something that "activist" judges
ignored. The answer no doubt depends on one's perspective. One thing,
however, is clear-do not expect the Eleventh Circuit to flyspeck district
court evidentiary rulings.
A number of amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence became
effective December 1, 2000. Amended Rule 103' may provide needed
clarity to the circumstances requiring a party to renew an objection or
to make an additional offer of proof. The new Rule provides that "[olnce
the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding
evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection
or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal."2 Thus, if a
court grants a motion in limine to exclude evidence, and assuming the

* Partner in the firm of Adams, Jordan & Treadwell, P.C., Macon, Georgia. Valdosta
State University (B.A., 1978); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D.,
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1. FED. R. EvID. 103.
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party wishing to propound the evidence made an adequate offer of proof,
that party need not make a further offer of proof at trial. Similarly, if
the trial court denies the motion in limine and rules that the evidence
will be admissible at trial, the party seeking to exclude that evidence
need not object at trial when the evidence is tendered. The same is true
of continuing objections during trial; they are no longer necessary.
However, the new Rule has both an express and, it would seem, an
implicit limitation, and cautious lawyers will likely think twice before
relying on a pretrial objection to preserve an issue for appeal. The
express limitation is that the ruling must be "definitive."3 Thus, if the
trial court's ruling is conditional or equivocal, the objecting or propounding party is required to act further when the evidence is tendered. The
implicit limitation is that the circumstances existing at the time of the
initial ruling must also exist when the issue arises at trial. For
example, the district court may, based upon the record at the time of its
ruling on a motion in limine, deny the motion. When the issue arises
again at trial, the record may contain additional facts relevant to the
issue. Similarly, a ruling excluding evidence may be entirely correct
based on the facts then known to the district court, but incorrect based
on additional facts developed at trial. In either event, a party should
renew his objection or make another offer of proof based on the changed
circumstances or additional facts.
Rule 404(a)(2) permits a defendant to offer evidence of a pertinent
trait of character of his alleged victim. 4 The amendment to Rule
404(a)(2) allows the prosecution to tender its own evidence of that same
character trait in rebuttal.'
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,6 has had a profound impact on the scope of
admissible expert testimony. Since Daubert, district courts and courts
of appeals have struggled to come to terms with the district courts' new
gatekeeper role in determining the admissibility of expert testimony.
Dauberthas now inspired amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Amended Rule 701 makes clear that lay witnesses cannot give opinion
testimony based on "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
within the scope of Rule 702." 7 In other words, the reliability require-

3. Id.
4. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
5. Id.
6. 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (holding that the trial judge must "ensur[e] that an expert's
testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand").
7. FED. R. EVID. 701.
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ments imposed by Daubert on expert testimony cannot be avoided by
labeling the witness a lay witness.
Amended Rule 702 basically codifies Daubert' and requires that
expert testimony must be "based upon sufficient facts or data," must be
the "product of reliable principles and methods," and those "principles
and methods [must be applied] reliably to the facts of the case. " '
Amended Rule .703 provides that facts or data, although relied upon
by an expert, cannot be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the
testimony unless the court determines that the probative value of the
facts or data "in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion
substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect." °
The business records exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 803(6)," has
been amended to allow the foundational requirements of the exception
to be established "by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule
902(12), or a statute permitting certification," rather than by a "live"
witness. 12 Thus, it is no longer necessary to bring a records custodian
into the courtroom to establish that documents satisfy the requirements
of the business records exception. To complement this amendment,
subdivisions 11 and 12 have been added to Rule 902, the Rule providing
the means of self-authentication. 13 Rule 902(11) permits a records
custodian to certify that domestic documents meet the requirements of
Rule 803(6).14 Rule 902(12) does the same for foreign records.15
II.

ARTICLE ONE: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Rule 101 provides that the Federal Rules of Evidence "govern
proceedings in the courts of the United States." 6 Notwithstanding this
seemingly clear statement, the precise application of the Rules can be
problematic. In diversity cases, state law provides the substantive rule
of decision, but federal law determines procedural issues, such as the
admission of evidence. However, there are exceptions to this general
rule. For example, in the case of presumptions of fact in civil cases,17

R. EVID. 702 advisory committee notes.
R. EVID. 702.
R. EVID. 703.
R. EVID. 803(6).

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

FED.
FED.
FED.
FED.
Id.
FED.
FED.

15.
16.
17.

FED. R. EVID. 902(12).
FED. R. EVID. 101.
FED. R. EVID. 302.

R. EVID. 902.
R. EVID. 902(11).
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privileges,'" and competency of witnesses, 9 if state law governs the
substantive issues, then state evidentiary rules control those evidentiary
issues. Also, what may nominally appear to be a state evidentiary rule
is sometimes held to be a state substantive law. This has universally
been the case with regard to parol evidence rules, which govern the
admissibility of oral agreements to vary or contradict contractual
language. During the current survey period, the Eleventh Circuit
reaffirmed that parol evidence rules are rules "of substantive law, not
20
evidence, so [they are] applied by federal courts sitting in diversity."
Rule 103(a) requires a party to object timely to the admission or
exclusion of evidence to preserve that issue for appeal.2 In the absence
of an objection, a party appealing the admission or exclusion of evidence
must establish "plain error."2 2 The Eleventh Circuit's unusually
fractious decision in United States v. Campbell,23 illustrates the
application and effect of the "plain error" rule. In Campbell customs
agents discovered cocaine in defendant's luggage as he attempted to
enter the United States. Defendant voluntarily gave an oral statement
to a customs agent who then reduced the statement to writing.2 4 In the
middle of the written statement, the agent wrote that "he had told
Campbell that 'nobody gives this amount of cocaine to somebody they
don't trust.'" 25 During the one day trial, the prosecution heavily relied
on defendant's statement and the agent's hearsay opinion that defendant
knew the cocaine was in his luggage. Defendant's attorney never
objected to the repeated use of the agent's opinion. On appeal, however,
defendant contended that the statement was hearsay and should not
have been admitted.26 In a per curiam majority opinion, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that because of the absence of an objection at trial,
defendant had to prove the prosecutor's use of the hearsay opinion was
plain error.27 Noting that while it did not condone the agent's conduct,
the court concluded that the admission of the opinion did not meet the
plain error standard.2" The court was "unwilling to say that a trial
court's failure to sua sponte redact a defendant's statement to remove

18.

FED. R. EVID. 501.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

FED. R. EVID. 601.
Ungerleider v. Gordon, 214 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2000).
FED. R. EVID. 103(a).
FED. R. EVID. 103(d).
223 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1287.
Id.
Id. at 1288.
Id.

28. Id.
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hearsay is error," much less plain error.29 The court determined that
even if there was plain error, the admission of the statement did not, for
several reasons, satisfy the second prong of the plain error standard-that the error effected defendant's "substantial rights."3" First,
the agent was subject to cross examination.3 Second, the agent could
have expressed the same opinion at trial as an expert witness. 2
Finally, there was other evidence from which the jury could conclude
that defendant knew the cocaine was in his luggage. 3
In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Godbold took the majority and the
Government to task.34 He particularly castigated the prosecution for
first manufacturing evidence-the agent's hearsay opinion-and then
repeatedly utilizing that evidence. To Judge Godbold, the agent's
insertion of his opinion in defendant's statement "was no less egregious
than police manufacture of evidence by planting a 'throw down' gun at
the scene of a crime or forging a confession."35 The heavy burden of the
plain error rule, Judge Godbold argued, should not "immunize the
government from the wrong of using evidence that it knows is tainted."36 Rather, the court should have treated the matter as one of
constitutional error and prosecutorial misconduct.37 Had it done so,
defendant's conviction would have been reversed and the case would
have been remanded for a fair trial.38
This is a shabby case. Our government can do better than this. It

would have elevated itself by confessing error, thereby sending a signal
to its agent that it demands rectitude from those who gather evidence
for our judicial system and those who use it. Absent that response this

court should say that what occurred in this case was wrong, and that
the responsibility for it should not be shifted to defense counsel but
should reverse and remand for the fair trial to which defendant is

entitled. 9

The practice pointer is that the plain error rule, if rigidly applied,
presents a nearly insurmountable obstacle to an appellant-an obstacle

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 1288-89.
Id. at 1289.
Id.
Id. In fact, the agent testified at trial, but he did not repeat his opinion. Id.
Id. at 1289.
Id. at 1290-96 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1293-94.
Id. at 1293-96.
Id. at 1295-96.
Id. at 1296.
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that cannot be avoided notwithstanding what may be egregious
misconduct by the opposing party in the use of the suspect evidence.
III.

ARTICLE

IV

RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS

Rule 404 is the principal rule of evidence governing the admissibility
of "extrinsic act evidence," or evidence of acts and transactions other
than the one at issue. 40 Rule 404 is primarily intended to bar the
introduction of propensity evidence or evidence of misconduct on other
occasions offered to prove that a party is more likely to have engaged in
the conduct at issue simply because of what he did on another occasion. 4' Although extrinsic act evidence is not admissible to prove a
party's propensity to engage in misconduct, it is admissible "for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."42 Extrinsic act
evidence is a favorite weapon of prosecutors. For example, prosecutors
frequently introduce evidence of a defendant's prior drug conviction to
prove his intent to commit a subsequent drug offense. Although the
evidence is ostensibly admitted to prove intent, no one could reasonably
argue that the evidence does not potentially lead a juror to conclude that
because a defendant committed the prior drug offense, he more likely
committed the charged offense.
During the current survey period, Rule 404(b) was mentioned in only
four Eleventh Circuit decisions and none of those decisions broke new
ground. The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that Rule 404(b) does not bar
the admission of extrinsic act evidence if that evidence is inextricably
intertwined with the evidence of the charged offense.4 ' The Eleventh
Circuit also reaffirmed the relatively low level of proof required to
establish the extrinsic act."
In United States v. Bowe,45 the court
held that "the uncorroborated word of an accomplice ... provides a
sufficient basis for concluding that the defendant committed extrinsic
acts admissible under Rule 404(b)."46

40. FED. R. EVID. 404.
41. Id.
42. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
43. United States v. Jiminez, 224 F.3d 1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000). Compare United
States v. Prosperi, 201 F.3d 1335, 1346 (11th Cir. 2000), in which the Eleventh Circuit
seemed to suggest that inextricably intertwined evidence is admissible pursuant to Rule
404(b) rather than in spite of it.
44. 224 F.3d at 1247-49.
45. 221 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2000).
46. Id. at 1192. In United States v. Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681,689 (1988), the Supreme
Court held that the prosecution need not prove the extrinsic act by a preponderance of the
evidence, but the "[e]vidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) only if it is relevant."
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In United States v. Chavez, 47 the Eleventh Circuit held that the
district court improperly admitted evidence of defendant's prior alleged
assaults on his wife during his trial for allegedly assaulting his wife
again. 4 The Eleventh Circuit found no permissible Rule 404(b) basis
for admitting the evidence.49 For example, intent was not an element
of the charged offense, so clearly the prior offenses were not relevant to
prove intent. Accordingly, the court concluded that the prosecution could
only have offered the evidence to prove defendant's bad character, i.e.,
his propensity to assault his wife.50 However, the court found the error
harmless.51
IV. ARTICLE VI: WITNESSES

606(b)5 2

Rule
sharply limits the use of juror testimony to challenge
a verdict.5" A juror may testify only with regard to "whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's
attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to
bear upon any juror." A juror may not testify about alleged improper
5 5 defenconduct inside the jury room.54 In United States v. Prosperi,
dant contended the district court improperly interpreted Rule 606(b)
when it rejected defendant's efforts to attack the verdict convicting him.
In Prosperi a dismissed alternate juror, during the course of the jury's
deliberations, told defendant's counsel that a juror had told her that she
was being pressured to convict defendant and that one juror made up his
mind to convict defendant on the first day of testimony and had
influenced the selection of a foreperson. Defendant's counsel moved for
a mistrial or, in the alternative, for an inquiry. The district court
refused, concluding that Rule 606(b) precluded any inquiry into the
jury's deliberations other than to investigate, as the prosecution
requested, whether the dismissed alternate juror had improperly
influenced the juror who called her. Although, acknowledging the broad
discretion of the courts in such matters, defendant contended that the
district court necessarily abused its discretion when it failed to conduct

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

204 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1317.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
Id.

54. Id. This differs from Georgia law, which allows jurors to testify in support of, but
not against, their verdict. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-9 (1982).

55. 201 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2000).
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an investigation.16 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed.57 Rule 606(b)
clearly prohibits investigations of allegations of internal influence, and
the district court properly exercised its discretion not to conduct such an
investigation.5"
Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit noted, investigating
charges of internal influence may well have constituted reversible
59
error.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Gil,"° addresses,
barely, a little known distinction between opinion and reputation
evidence of character. In Gil defendant contended the district court
improperly excluded the testimony of her character witness. The district
court disallowed the testimony because the witness had no contact with
defendant during the year she was arrested and, thus, did not have an
adequate basis for expressing an opinion on defendant's character. On
appeal defendant contended that Rule 608(a) permitted her to call a
witness to express an opinion as to her character for truthfulness.6 '
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, stating its reasoning in one sentence:
"While the district court acknowledged the courts are more flexible
regarding the admissibility of opinion testimony, such as this, as opposed
to reputation testimony, the court properly distinguished [United States
v.] Watson as addressing the credibility of witness testimony, not the
character of a defendant." 2 The Eleventh Circuit did not elaborate on
the distinction between reputation testimony and opinion testimony.
Nor did it elaborate on the district court's rationale for distinguishing
Watson.
Watson,"8 the Eleventh Circuit's leading decision on the issue, merits
discussion. In Watson the district court excluded the testimony of six
witnesses offered by defendants to give testimony regarding a critical
witness' character for truthfulness. Some of the witnesses were to testify
with regard to that witness' reputation for truthfulness and others were
to express opinions on the witness' character for truthfulness.6 4 With
regard to the reputation witnesses, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the
witnesses had not known the key witness at the appropriate time to

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 1338-40.
Id. at 1340.
Id.
Id. at 1340-41.
204 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1351-52.

62. Id. (citing United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1382 (11th Cir. 1982)) (internal
citation omitted).

63. 669 F.2d 1374 (11th Cir. 1982).
64. Id. at 1381.
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testify with regard to the witness' reputation for truthfulness. 6 The
opinion witnesses, however, were another matter and presented "the
most troubling issue in this case."6 The court noted Rule 608 "'imposes no prerequisite condition of long acquaintance or recent information
about the witness; cross examination can be expected to expose defects
of lack of familiarity and to reveal reliance on isolated or irrelevant
instances of misconduct or the existence of feelings of personal hostility
towards the principal witness.' 67 An opinion witness is simply stating
his impression of another witness' character for truthfulness.
Thus, it would seem, that Watson supported defendant's argument in
Gil-the district court improperly required her to lay the foundation that
her opinion witness had contact with her during the year of the alleged
defense. However, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Watson was not
applicable because it addressed a witness' character rather than a
defendant's character.6 8 That certainly is true, but it is not necessarily
clear why that makes a difference. In both situations, a witness is
attempting to express his opinion on someone else's character for
truthfulness.
V. ARTICLE VII: OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY

As discussed in previous surveys, Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceu70
ticals, Inc.69 dramatically changed the landscape of expert testimony.
For the first time since Daubert was decided, the survey period did not
include a significant Daubert related decision by the Eleventh Circuit.
Indeed, Daubert was only mentioned by the Eleventh Circuit in two
cases 7 1 and neither is noteworthy.
VI.

ARTICLE VIII: HEARSAY

In years past, the inherent conflict between hearsay evidence and the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment has provided fertile
ground for Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court decisions. However, if

65. Id. at 1381-82.
66. Id. at 1382.
67. Id. (quoting United States v. Lollar, 606 F.2d 587, 589 (5th Cir. 1979)).
68. Gil, 204 F.3d at 1352.
69. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
70. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 51 MERCER L. REV. 1165, 1177-83 (2000); Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 50 MERCER L. REV. 1019, 1025-31 (1999); Marc T. Treadwell,
Evidence, 49 MERCER L. REV. 1027, 1039-41 (1998); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 48
MERCER L. REV. 1607, 1618-23 (1997).
71. See Tool v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2000); Johnson v.
DeSoto County Bd. of Comm'rs, 204 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2000).
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the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Rodriguez," is any
indication, the level of judicial scrutiny of this issue, as with other
evidentiary issues, has been lowered. In Rodriguez defendant objected
on hearsay grounds to the admission of evidence that the prosecution
used to establish that defendant's alleged robbery of six motels impacted
interstate commerce, an element of the charged offense. Specifically, the
district court allowed motel employees to testify that they registered out
of state or foreign guests. On appeal defendant also argued that the
admission of this evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confront his witnesses.73 The district court admitted the testimony
pursuant to Rule 807, the catchall or residual exception to the hearsay
rule. Defendant argued that the statements were not sufficiently
trustworthy to satisfy Rule 807's requirement that the statement have
"circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" equivalent to the
trustworthiness of statements admissible pursuant to Rule 803 or
804. 74 The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in finding the requisite trustworthiness.75 Had the
Eleventh Circuit considered the merits of defendant's Confrontation
Clause claim, it may have faced an interesting issue. The Confrontation
Clause does not bar the admission of hearsay statements against a
criminal defendant if they bear "adequate 'indicia of reliability.'" 76 In
Bourjaily v. United States,7 7 the Supreme Court held that the requisite
reliability could be assumed if the evidence "'falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception.'"78 If it does not, the circumstances surrounding the
statement have to be examined to determine if the statement is
sufficiently trustworthy. In this event, the reliability of the statement
cannot be established by corroborating evidence, but rather the
statement "must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent
trustworthiness."9

72. 218 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 007223, 2001 WL 12992 (Jan. 8, 2001).
73. There is a practice pointer in the Eleventh Circuit's pointed comment that
defendant did not raise the Confrontation Clause issue at trial. Id. at 1246. While it may
seem implicit that a hearsay objection in a criminal trial implicates a defendant's right to
confront his witnesses, the mere objection on the grounds of hearsay does not raise the
constitutional issue.
74. 218 F.3d at 1244-46.
75. Id. at 1246.
76. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
77. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
78. Id. at 183 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
79. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990).
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Residual exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as Rule 807, are not
considered firmly rooted hearsay exceptions, and thus statements
admitted pursuant to those exceptions are not deemed reliable for
purposes of the Confrontation Clause.8 ° Thus, Rodriguez potentially
presented the issue of whether the Confrontation Clause requirement of
trustworthiness is different than Rule 807's requirement of trustworthiness. However, the Eleventh Circuit did not address this issue. The
court simply held that there was no "plain error in evaluating defendant's Confrontation Clause claim."8 '
The Eleventh Circuit also addressed Confrontation Clause issues in
United States v. Siddiqui, 2 a case presenting interesting and unique
facts. In Siddiqui defendant faced charges arising from his efforts to
secure a half million dollar research grant from the National Science
Foundation. Defendant submitted an application over the name of Dr.
Hamuri Yamada nominating defendant for the award. The application
listed three references, including a Dr. von Gunten. In response to a
letter from the National Science Foundation confirming his support for
defendant's nomination, von Gunten said that he had never submitted
such a letter. The National Science Foundation alerted authorities, who
soon discovered that defendant had falsely submitted the nomination.
Both Yamada and von Gunten lived abroad and the prosecution moved
the court for permission to take their depositions. In support of its
motion, the prosecution offered evidence that the witnesses would not
appear in the United States for a trial. Defendant opposed the
depositions on several grounds, including the ground that Indian travel
restrictions for its citizens living abroad prevented him from traveling
outside the United States. Because of these restrictions, defendant
argued, his relatives residing in India could be subject to religious
prosecution if he traveled abroad. A magistrate ruled that the depositions could proceed. Defendant's attorneys appeared at each deposition
83
and, at one deposition, were in telephone contact with defendant.
On appeal of his conviction, defendant contended that the admission
of Yamada's and von Gunten's deposition testimony violated his Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation. 4 However, the Eleventh Circuit
noted that defendant made no request of either the magistrate judge or
the Government for assistance in arranging travel abroad under

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

United States v. Deeb, 13 F.3d 1532, 1538 (11th Cir. 1994).
Rodriguez, 218 F.3d at 1246.
235 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1320-21.
Id. at 1324.
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circumstances that would not put his family at risk. 5 This indicated,
to the Eleventh Circuit, that defendant made a calculated decision not
to alert Indian authorities by seeking to lift travel restrictions. 6 "After
failing to authorize the government to proceed on his behalf, Siddiqui
cannot now claim that his confrontation rights were violated by the
government's failure to act unilaterally." 7 Moreover, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that defendant's counsel appeared at the depositions and
cross-examined the witnesses and that defendant was in telephone
contact with his lawyer during the Yamada deposition. 8
While
depositions are generally disfavored in criminal cases, particularly
depositions in foreign countries, they are permissible depending on the
circumstances. Given the circumstances of the depositions in Siddiqui,
the court refused to find that defendant's Confrontation Clause rights
were impinged.89
Defendant also argued that the magistrate judge's determination that
von Gunten and Hamuri Yamada were unavailable to testify at trial
violated defendant's right to confront the witnesses.9" The Eleventh
Circuit's legal analysis of this issue illustrates an interesting point.
Stating the classic Ohio v. Roberts9 test, the Eleventh Circuit said the
Confrontation Clause requires the prosecution "to show (1) that the outof-court declarant is unavailable to testify despite [the prosecution's]
good faith efforts to obtain his presence at trial, and (2) that the out-ofcourt statements bear sufficient indicia of reliability to provide the jury
with an adequate basis for evaluating their truth."92 However, the
unavailability requirement has largely disappeared from Confrontation
Clause analysis. In United States v. Inadi,93 the Supreme Court held
that Roberts does not stand for the blanket proposition that "no out-ofcourt statement can be introduced ... without a showing that the
declarant is unavailable." 94 Then, in White v. Illinois,95 the Supreme
Court held that Roberts should be limited to its facts. 6 Thus a

85.

Id. at 1323.

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1324.
89. Id. at 1325.
90. Id. at 1324.
91. 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).
92. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d at 1324 (citing United States v. Chapman, 866 F.2d 1326, 1330
(llth Cir. 1989)).
93. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
94. Id. at 394.
95. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
96. Id. at 354.
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showing of unavailability must be made only when hearsay is admitted
pursuant to the exception for statements made in the course of a prior
judicial proceeding, the hearsay exception at issue in Roberts."7
In fact, it is probably fair to say that the availability of the out-ofcourt declarant is not a factor in Confrontation Clause analysis. It is,
however, a factor in Rule 804 analysis, which provides hearsay
exceptions when the declarant is unavailable.
Even though the
testimony was given in depositions convened as a part of the criminal
prosecution, they nevertheless were hearsay pursuant to Rule 801
because they were "statement[s] other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered into evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted." 8 Rule 804(b)(1) recognizes this and
provides an exception for former testimony "given as a witness ...in a
deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or
another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now
offered ... had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination."99 Clearly, the
depositions in Siddiqui fell within this exception. Thus, the only
question was whether the facts were sufficient to demonstrate that the
witnesses were unavailable, and the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
they were." ° However, the unavailability showing was not required
by the Confrontation Clause, as the Eleventh Circuit arguably suggested,
'
but by Rule 804(b)(1).1 O
Rule 801(b)(1)(B) provides that a prior consistent statement is not
hearsay if it is offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive. For example, a party may successfully tender a
witness' prior statement that is consistent with his trial testimony to
demonstrate that the trial testimony is truthful. In Tome v. United
States, °2 the Supreme Court, resolving a conflict among the circuits,
held that a prior consistent statement is not admissible to rebut a charge
of recent fabrication unless
the prior statement was made before the
10 3
motive to fabricate arose.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
L. REV.

Id. at 356.
FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
Siddiqui, 235 F.3d at 1324.
Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
513 U.S. 150 (1995).
Id. at 167. For a discussion of Tome, see Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 47 MERCER
837, 845-46 (1996).
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In United States v. Prieto,0 4 the Eleventh Circuit addressed an issue
of first impression spawned by Tome."'5 In Prieto the prosecution
successfully tendered a witness' post-arrest statement that was
consistent with his trial testimony to rebut a charge that the trial
testimony was motivated by the witness' cooperation agreement with the
Government.' °
The post-arrest statement was made before the
execution of the cooperation agreement, but defendant argued that "any
post-arrest statement is necessarily tinged with a motive to lie in order
to curry favor with the government."0 7 In other words, as the Eleventh Circuit put it, the defense sought the creation of a "bright line, per
se rule barring the admission of any prior consistent statements made
by a witness following arrest."0 8 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that
post-arrest statements are not automatically contaminated by a motive
to fabricate. 9 Rather, a witness's post-arrest statement can be driven
by a variety of motives and reasons, including, for example, the witness'
conscience." 0 Thus, whether a post-arrest statement is motivated by
a desire to obtain favorable treatment depends on the facts surrounding
the statement and must necessarily be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Because the district court carefully examined the facts surrounding the
post-arrest statement and concluded that the witness was not motivated
by an anticipated cooperation agreement with the Government, the
Eleventh Circuit did not find any error in this factual conclusion."'
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides that statements by a co-conspirator are
admissible against a conspirator if made during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy. 112 In United States v. Bowe," 3 defendant argued that Rule 801(d)(2)(E) is limited in its application to the
conspiracies alleged in an indictment. Thus, defendant argued, the
district court improperly admitted a co-conspirator's statement made in
furtherance of a conspiracy that was not charged in the indictment. ""
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that "the conspiracy that forms

104. 232 F.3d 816 (11th Cir. 2000).
105. Id. at 820.

106. Id.
107.
108.
109,
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 820-21.
Id. at 822.

112.

FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).

113.
114.

221 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1193.
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the basis for admitting a co-conspirator's out of court statements need
not be the same conspiracy for which the defendant is charged."115
VII.

ARTICLE

IX: AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION

The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Siddiqui presented another
interesting issue, this one involving the authentication of email.'
In
Siddiqui Yamada testified that she received an email from defendant.
Yamada knew the email came from defendant because it contained his
address and it ended with defendant's nickname "Mo." Later, Yamada
received another email from defendant requesting that she confirm that
she had permitted defendant to sign the nomination form on her behalf.
Defendant also telephoned Yamada on this subject. During Yamada's
cross-examination, defendant's counsel introduced an email from
Yamada to defendant that contained the same email address for
defendant as the email sent by defendant to Yamada. Von Gunten also
testified that he received an email from defendant and that he replied
to this email by using the reply function of his email program, meaning
that his response was simply returned to the sender. Defendant's email
to von Gunten also was signed "Mo." In addition, the information
contained in the email messages revealed that they had been authored
by someone familiar with defendant's conduct with regard to the
research grant. Finally, the telephone calls between Yamada and von
Gunten, both of whom testified that they recognized defendant's voice,
were consistent with the substance of the email."7 Under these
circumstances, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not
err in ruling that the email had been properly authenticated."'
VIII.

ARTICLE X: CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS, AND
PHOTOGRAPHS

Rule 1006 provides that the "contents of voluminous writings,
recordings, or photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in
court may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation.""' In United States v. Richardson,2 ' defendant contended that

115. Id.
116. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d at 1322.
117. Id. at 1322-23.
118. Id. at 1323. Defendant also contended that the email contained hearsay, an
objection not made at trial and which, in any event, the Eleventh Circuit found to be
wholly without merit. Id. Once authenticated as messages from defendant, they became
admissions of a party opponent pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(A). Id.
119. FED. R. EVID. 1006.
120. 233 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2000).
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the district court improperly admitted the prosecution's charts summarizing evidence because of the conclusory headings of the charts. Each
summary chart included one column of activity that was characterized
as "unauthorized." The district court instructed the jury that the
question of whether the activity was in fact unauthorized was a matter
for them to decide. After the ninth summary chart was offered into
evidence, the prosecution changed the heading from "unauthorized
transaction" to "questioned transaction."'21 The Eleventh Circuit held
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
charts, but it acknowledged the potential for abuse with summaries 12of
evidence and cautioned that they should be carefully scrutinized.
The court noted that while it is not necessary that the information
contained in summaries or charts be free of any assumptions, those
assumptions must be supported by evidence in the record. 23 Also, the
court stated that the trial court should instruct the jury, as the district
12 4
court did, that the ultimate decision must be made by the jury.
IX.

MISCELLANEOUS

In United States v. Richardson,'25 the Eleventh Circuit addressed,
apparently for the first time, whether a trial court can allow jurors to
ask questions during the course of a trial.12 During defendant's six
week trial, the district court asked witnesses twenty-three sets of
questions that had been submitted by jurors."' The Eleventh Circuit
rejected defendant's contention that juror-posed questions deprived
defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial. 2 ' Nevertheless,
the Eleventh Circuit noted the possible danger inherent in the practice. 1 29 For example, permitting jurors to ask questions may have the
effect of turning a juror into an advocate with a mission to obtain
information that would advance his cause. Also, the process of
formulating questions may induce a juror to begin prematurely his
evaluation of the evidence.3 0
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 1293.
Id. at 1293-94.
Id. at 1294.
Id.
233 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2000).

126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 1288-91.
Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1291.
Id.

130. The evidence for and against juror questioning appears to be anecdotal. In the
author's one experience with juror questioning during a lengthy trial, the district court

eventually was forced to discharge one juror and to instruct the remaining jurors that no
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suggested the following guidelines for juror-questioning: (1) questions
should be factual in nature and should not question or test legal issues
or theories; (2) jurors should submit their questions in writing to the
trial judge rather than questioning the witness directly, thus allowing
the court the opportunity to screen the question and the parties to voice
objections; (3) the jury should be instructed on the proper use of
questions and admonished not to allow their questioning to lead them
to prejudge the issues; and (4) juror questions should be limited to the
most important factual points.131

further questions would be accepted.
131. 233 F.3d at 1290-91.
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